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Abstract—Intra-session network coding is known to be vul-
nerable to pollution attacks. In this work, first, we introduce a
novel homomorphic MAC scheme called SpaceMac, which allows
an intermediate node to verify if its received packets belong
to a specific subspace, even if the subspace is expanding over
time. Then, we use SpaceMac as a building block to design
a cooperative scheme that provides complete defense against
pollution attacks: (i) it can detect polluted packets early at
intermediate nodes and (ii) it can identify the exact location of
all, even colluding, attackers, thus making it possible to eliminate
them. Our scheme is cooperative: parents and children of any
node cooperate to detect any corrupted packets sent by the node,
and nodes in the network cooperate with a central controller
to identify the exact location of all attackers. We implement
SpaceMac in both C/C++ and Java as a library, and we make
the library available online. Our evaluation on both a PC and
an Android device shows that (i) SpaceMac’s algorithms can be
computed quickly (∼ 28 µs in C/C++) and efficiently (∼ 64 KB
in C/C++), and (ii) our cooperative defense scheme has both low
computation (∼ 190 µs in C/C++) and low communication (∼
2%) overhead, significantly less than other comparable state-of-
the-art schemes.
Index Terms—Byzantine attacks, pollution attacks, network
coding, attack detection, attack location, homomorphic MAC
I. INTRODUCTION
THE network coding paradigm advocates that intermediatenodes in a network should mix incoming packets instead
of simply forwarding them, and receivers should decode to
obtain the original packets. This idea, originally introduced by
Ahlswede et al. [1], has been shown to bring benefits in terms
of throughput and distributed operation of networks, and has
received much attention. In this work, we consider networks
that employ intra-session linear network coding.
An inherent weakness of network coding is that it is
particularly vulnerable to pollution (a.k.a. Byzantine) attacks.
Malicious nodes can inject corrupted packets into a network.
These packets are combined and forwarded by downstream
nodes, causing a large number of corrupted packets propa-
gate in the network. This wastes resources of the network,
such as bandwidth and CPU time, and eventually prevents
the decoding of the original packets at the receivers. The
detrimental effect of pollution attacks has been shown through
both theoretical analysis [2] as well as experimentation [3], [4].
Proposed defense mechanisms against pollution attacks can
be classified into three categories: error correction [5]–[8],
attack detection [4], [9]–[18], and locating attackers [19], [20].
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In this paper, we are interested in the latter two approaches.
In particular, we set out to design a complete defense system
that can not only detect the pollution attack in a timely manner
but also accurately locate and eliminate all pollution attackers.
This allows for dealing with any attack early and at its root.
To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing defense
mechanisms can provide this level of protection.
To this end, we first propose a novel homomorphic message
authentication code (MAC) scheme for expanding spaces
called SpaceMac. SpaceMac allows a node to verify if its
received packets belong to a specific subspace, even if the
subspace is expanding over time. We then design our novel
cooperative defense system which includes both a detection
scheme and a locating scheme, using SpaceMac as their
building block. Our detection scheme relies on SpaceMac to
force intermediate nodes to send only linear combinations of
packets that they actually receive from their parents. Parents
and children of any intermediate node cooperate to detect
corrupted packets sent by the intermediate node. Our locat-
ing scheme uses SpaceMac to force nodes in the network
to truthfully cooperate with a central controller so that the
controller can exactly locate the pollution attackers. Finally,
by leveraging multiple generations, our scheme is able to deal
with a large number of colluding attackers.
The main contribution of this paper is twofold:
• The design and implementation of SpaceMac: We
describe the construction of SpaceMac and provide a
formal security proof for the construction. We implement
SpaceMac in both C/C++ and Java as a ready-to-use
library. Our Java implementation is compatible with the
current Android OS (Android 2.2 Froyo). We make the
library available online [21].
• The design of a novel cooperative defense system
based on SpaceMac: To the best of our knowledge,
our defense system is the first that meets all of the
following requirements simultaneously: (i) it can provide
timely in-network detection, (ii) it can exactly locate all
pollution attackers, (iii) it can deal with a large number
of colluding attackers, and (iv) it has low communication
and computation overhead.
We have extensively evaluated the computation overhead
of SpaceMac’s algorithms and both the computation and
communication overhead of our defense scheme through real
implementation in both C/C++ and Java, and on both a PC and
an Android device (Samsung Captivate). Our evaluation results
show that all three algorithms of SpaceMac (Mac, Combine,
ar
X
iv
:1
10
2.
35
04
v5
  [
cs
.C
R]
  1
6 S
ep
 20
11
and Verify) can be computed efficiently (requiring 64 KB of
memory in C/C++ or 128 KB in Java) and also quickly on a PC
(< 28 µs in C/C++) and even on a smart phone (< 2.3 ms).
Evaluation results also demonstrate that when implementing
our defense scheme, nodes in the network introduce very small
computational delay (in the order of sub-millisecond on the PC
and millisecond on the smart phone). Moreover, our defense
scheme was shown to introduce very low communication
overhead (2%), significantly less than other comparable state-
of-the-art schemes. Lastly, through a simulation in Python, we
show that in a medium-size network of 50 nodes, our locating
scheme can quickly locate all, even colluding attackers (20
attackers in about 1 second).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II discusses existing approaches to protect network coding
against pollution attacks. Section III formulates the problem,
describes the threat model, and discusses our design goals.
Section IV presents our key observations and the overview
of our approach. Section V presents the construction of
SpaceMac and the formal security proof. Section VI describes
our detection scheme. Section VII describes our locating
scheme. Section VIII analyzes the security of our proposed
schemes. Section IX presents our implementation and the
evaluation results. Finally, we conclude in Section X.
II. RELATED WORK
There are three main approaches in the literature to com-
bat pollution attacks: error correction, attack detection, and
locating attacks. Below, we discuss each one in detail.
A. Error Correction
One of the earliest work on error correction for network
coding is by Cai and Yeung [5]. The study in [5] introduces
network error-correcting codes as a generalization of the
traditional error correction codes. In a related study by Zhang
[8], the minimum rank of a network error correction code is
defined; this concept is analogous to the minimum distance
in classical coding theory. Based on this concept, a network
error correction codes similar to an ordinary linear network
single source multicast code is designed. Jaggi et al. [22]
consider packets from an attacker as an additional source and
add redundancy at the source so that the receivers can decode
both sources: the original source and adversary’s source. In
[7], Koetter and Kschischang proposed a coding metric on
subspaces and a minimum distance decoder, which give rise
to codes capable of correcting certain combinations of errors
and erasures.
These information theoretic approaches, which aim at cor-
recting errors at the receivers, offer only limited security
against restricted types of adversaries. These approaches as-
sume that the adversaries can only corrupt a small number of
edges and packets. Also, the amount of redundancy, which can
also be considered as the communication overhead, typically
increases proportional to the number of corrupted packets or
adversaries. Furthermore, these approaches do not detect and
drop corrupted packets, and thus are unable to prevent the
corrupted packets from propagating in the network and using
up resources.
In contrast, our defense scheme is able to provide timely
detection of the attack, thereby allowing for early filtering
of corrupted packets. More importantly, our approach can
accurately locate the attackers to eliminate them from the net-
work. Furthermore, our approach can deal with more powerful
adversaries, i.e., adversaries who pollute arbitrary number of
packets and even colluding adversaries. However, we make an
assumption on the adversaries’ computational power, which is
typical of all approaches utilizing cryptographic primitives.
B. Attack Detection
We first describe approaches that do not use homomorphic
cryptography. In [15], Ho et al. show that randomized network
coding can be extended to provide end-to-end attack detec-
tion, i.e., allow the receivers to detect any corrupted packet.
The extension requires the source node to include in each
source packet some additional hash blocks calculated from the
source data blocks using polynomial functions. More recently,
Kehdi and Li [16] propose an in-network detection scheme
which exploits subspace properties of network coding. In their
scheme, intermediate nodes verify the integrity of a vector
by checking if it belongs to the subspace spanned by the
source vectors. Null keys, which are vectors orthogonal to
all the combinations of the source vectors, are used for the
verification. This scheme is not collusion resistant: multiple
nodes can collude to infer the null keys and make benign
nodes accept polluted vectors. Yu et al. [17] use simple
XOR checksums and exploit probabilistic key pre-distribution
to provide in-network detection. This scheme, however, has
significant communication overhead due to the aggregation
of authentication tags; moreover, the scheme is c-collusion
resistant for some pre-determined constant c, i.e., the scheme
becomes vulnerable when there are more than c colluding
attackers. In [3], Dong et al. design a linear transformation
checksums to be used with a time-based authentication scheme
to provide in-network detection. This scheme requires time
synchronization among nodes in the network and frequent
public key verification (one per generation).
A significant number of homomorphic cryptographic prim-
itives ranging from hashes, signatures, to MACs, has been
designed specifically to combat pollution attacks in network
coding. In [9], Krohn et al. proposed a homomorphic hash
scheme for verification of rateless erasure codes. Gkantsidis
and Rodriguez [4] later propose probabilistic checking and
cooperation mechanisms among nodes to reduce the compu-
tation overhead when using Krohn et al.’s scheme in peer-to-
peer file distribution systems. Li et al. [23] also propose a
hash-based scheme based on a trapdoor one-way permutation
which can avoid the pre-distribution of the hash blocks. In
[14], Zhao et al. propose a signature scheme where the source
derives authentication information from a vector orthogonal to
the source space. In [13], Charles et al. propose a signature
scheme based on aggregate signatures. Recently, Boneh et
al. presents a signature scheme built on bilinear maps [12]. All
of the hash-based and signature-based approaches suffer from
a common drawback: they require expensive computation at
intermediate nodes, either modular exponentiation or bilinear
map, which results in high latency.
Recently, two homomorphic MAC schemes are proposed by
two groups of researchers: Agrawal and Boneh [10], and Li et
al. [11]. The scheme in [10] relies on cover free set systems
for pre-distributing keys to provide in-network detection, and
thus, only c-collusion resistant. This scheme is also susceptible
to tag-pollution attacks, where malicious nodes tamper with
some subset of tags of a packet. We discuss about this type
of attack in detail in Section VIII-C. The scheme in [11] is
collusion resistant (rather than c-collusion resistant) as well as
resistant against tag-pollution attacks; however, it requires time
synchronization among nodes in the network. Both schemes
have low computation overhead since they only require simple
addition and multiplication operations at intermediate nodes
for both combining MAC tags and tag verification. In a more
recent work [18], Zhang et al. introduce both a homomorphic
MAC and a homomorphic signature scheme and propose a
hybrid approach that uses both. This approach is not suscepti-
ble to tag-pollution attack but only c-collusion resistant. This
approach also has lower computation overhead than signature-
based approaches; however, the overhead is still significantly
higher than the other two MAC-based approaches due to the
expensive exponentiation operations required by the signature
scheme.
Our SpaceMac scheme is inspired by the MAC scheme in
[10]; however, our scheme allows intermediate nodes to sign
-expanding over time- subspaces. This stands in stark contrast
to [10], which allows for signing only fixed subspaces. Our
scheme can be considered as a generalization of the scheme
in [10]. Detailed description and comparison are provided in
Section V. SpaceMac was originally introduced for authenti-
cating expanding subspaces and locating the attackers in our
preliminary work [24]. In this paper, we show that the ability
to authenticate expanding subspaces can also be utilized to
provide timely in-network detection without requiring time
synchronization as in [11].
C. Locating Attackers
Compared to the other two categories, locating attackers
has received less attention. An early work by Jafarisiavoshani
et al. [19] leverages the subspace properties of random-
ized network coding to locate pollution attackers. The main
observation is that packets sent by a node have to belong
to the space spanned by source packets and also the space
spanned by the packets the node receives from its parents.
Using this observation, in a general network topology having
a single attacker, the authors can locate the attacker with an
uncertainty of at most two nodes; when there are multiple
attackers, the uncertainty is within a set of nodes including the
attackers and their parents and children. Our scheme builds on
and significantly improves this work: we make it possible to
pinpoint the exact location of the attackers, even in the case
where there are multiple colluding attackers, thereby allowing
for the removal of all attackers.
Recently, Wang et al. [20] introduce a light-weight non-
repudiation protocol ensuring that (i) a malicious node that
Symbol Explanation
vi source packet, formed by augmenting vˆi with coefficients
n the number of symbols carried in each packet vˆi
m size of a generation
PN , CN the parent set and the child set of N
S,R, I source node, receiver set, intermediate node set
ΠS source space, spanned by source packets
ΠN sending space, spanned by packets sent by N
ΠPN ,ΠN received space of N from P and from all parents
TABLE I
Notation
injected a polluted packet cannot deny its behavior and (ii)
a malicious node cannot disparage any innocent node. They
build a defense scheme based on the protocol to identify
malicious nodes. The scheme in [20] performs flooding of
multiple checksums of all the packets sent by the source to all
the nodes, which incurs significant communication overhead.
Moreover, because the success of the locating scheme relies
on the successful reception of the checksums at every node,
this scheme is vulnerable to colluding attackers. Finally, this
scheme is unable to locate all the attackers. We use their
non-repudiation protocol as a building block of our locating
scheme. However, unlike the scheme in [20], our scheme is
able to locate all, even colluding attackers, without the need
of checksums.
Finally, compared to our prior preliminary work [24], where
we first presented SpaceMac and our locating scheme, this
work is significantly improved and extended by the following
three novel contributions: (i) we describe a novel construc-
tion of SpaceMac, whose algorithms are significantly more
computational efficient than our previous construction; (ii) we
describe a novel detection scheme built on SpaceMac that
can provide in-network detection with low overhead; and (iii)
we implement the SpaceMac library in both C/C++ and Java
and we extensively evaluate both SpaceMac and the proposed
defense scheme on both a PC and an Android device.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we describe the notation that we use to
express network operations in a multicast session with intra-
session coding. In addition, we describe the threat model and
the design goals of our defense system.
A. Network Model and Operation
We follow the notation used in [10] and [19]. Consider a
fixed, directed acyclic graph (DAG), denoted by G = (V, E).
There is a single source node S that multicasts packets to a
set of receivers, denoted by R. Denote the set of intermediate
nodes as I, i.e., I = V \ {R ∪ {S}}. Nodes in I perform
generation-based linear network coding. A generation consists
of m packets, vˆ1, · · · , vˆm, in an n-dimensional linear space
Fnq , where m,n and q are fixed ahead of time and q  1. The
source augments every packet vˆi with m additional symbols,
which are the coefficients of vˆi. The resulting packets, vi’s,
called source packets, have the following form:
vi = (—vˆi—,
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, · · · , 0, 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
, 0, · · · , 0) ∈ Fn+mq .
Note that if a packet y is a linear combination of the
packets vi’s, then the last m symbols of packet y contain the
global linear combination coefficients. The source S sends the
packets vi’s to the network. Denote the subspace spanned by
packets vi’s by ΠS ⊆ Fn+mq . We refer to ΠS as the source
space.
We use PN and CN to denote the sets of parents and children
of a node N , respectively. Each intermediate node N receives
from PN some packets, which are linear combinations of
the source packets. It then creates linear combinations of the
received packets and sends them to its adjacent downstream
nodes. We use ΠPN (t) ⊆ Fn+mq to denote the space spanned
by the packets received by node N from a parent node P ,
P ∈ PN , up to time t. We further use ΠN (t) to denote the
space spanned by all the packets received by node N from all
its parents up to time t. We also denote the space spanned by
all the packets sent by a node N up to time t as ΠN (t). When
there is no ambiguity, we omit the time index t. A receiver
R ∈ R can successfully decode the original source packets
using Gaussian elimination if its received space ΠR equals
the source space ΠS .
If all the nodes in the network are benign, then the space
spanned by packets sent by N , ΠN , must be a subspace of
the space spanned by the packets that N receives, ΠN . This is
a property of networks that implement random linear network
coding. This observation was also made in [19]. Formally,
Lemma 1. If every node in the network is benign then for
every node N , ΠN (t) ⊆ ΠN (t).
Also, observe that for any parent P of N , both ΠPN and ΠN
expand over time. Formally, ΠPN (t0) ⊆ ΠPN (t1) and ΠN (t0) ⊆
ΠN (t1), for all t0 ≤ t1
Furthermore, when all the intermediate nodes N ∈ I are
benign, the incoming spaces of all the intermediate nodes
and the receivers are subspaces of the source space. Assume
that there is a pollution attacker in the network. The attacker
combines a subspace Π∗ * ΠS with its incoming space
and sends the resulting packets to its children; as a result,
the incoming spaces of these children are not subspaces of
ΠS . Formally, for every node N,N ∈ V \ {S}, its incoming
space ΠPN from its parent P can be decomposed as follows:
ΠPN = Π
SP
N ⊕ ΠˆPN , where ⊕ denotes the direct sum of spaces,
ΠSPN
def
= ΠS ∩ΠPN , and ΠˆPN contains packets not belonging to
ΠS . Table I summarizes the notation used in this paper.
Following the framework in [19], we define a polluted
directed edge as follows:
Definition 1. A directed edge is polluted if it transmits any
packet which is not a linear combination of the source packets.
The following lemma, adapted from [19], is a direct conse-
quence of the definition:
Lemma 2. A directed edge e(P,N) is polluted if and only if
ΠPN * ΠS .
B. Threat Model
We assume that both the source and the receivers are
trustworthy but the intermediate nodes may be malicious. The
Defense System Built on SpaceMac
Detection Scheme
Exploited Subspace Relationship:
- ∏N ⊆ ∏N
Cooperation:
Parents and Children of N
Properties:
- In-network Detection
- Tag-Pollution Resistant
- Arbitrary Collusion Resistant
- Low Overhead
Locating Scheme
Exploited Subspace Relationship:
- ∏PN ⊆ ∏
S
Cooperation:
All Nodes and Controller
Properties:
- Exact Locating
- Tag-Pollution Resistant
- Arbitrary Collusion Resistant
- Low Overhead
Fig. 1. Cooperative defense system’s main components, their exploited
subspace relationships, and their properties
case when the receivers are malicious is discussed separately in
Section VIII-E. We assume that the network may have multiple
pollution attackers. They may be located at an arbitrary set of
intermediate nodes in the network. Each attacker may inject
corrupted packets, i.e., packets that do not belong to the source
space, into a single or multiple downstream edges to pollute
the network. They may also modify other data associated
with the packets, such as, authentication tags. Successful
modification of authentication tags constitutes an attack called
“tag pollution,” which could be as devastating as a pollution
attack [11]. Tag pollution attacks are discussed separately in
Section VIII-C. We consider both cases where the pollution
attackers launch their attacks independently or collude and
coordinate their attacks. We further assume that the attackers
are aware of our defense scheme, i.e., the construction and
application of SpaceMac; however, similar to other crypto-
graphic approaches, we assume that the attackers’ running time
is polynomial in the security parameter.
C. Design Goals
With this threat model in mind, we set out to design a
defense system with the following goals:
(1) In-network Detection. Any intermediate node in the net-
work should be able to detect the attack as soon as
its malicious parent injects a corrupted packet into the
network. This prevents corrupted packets from polluting
the downstream edges.
(2) Exact Locating. The location of all pollution attackers
should be precisely identified. This allows for the removal
of the attackers from the network.
(3) Arbitrary Collusion Resistance. The system should able
to cope with multiple pollution attackers when they attack
independently as well as when they collude. In particular,
the defense system should be able to remove the attackers
from the network even when they collude.
(4) Low Overhead. The defense system should have low com-
putation and low communication overhead. In particular,
the system should require a little amount of computing
from the nodes in the network and should not introduce a
large amount of traffic, e.g., bandwidth of the MAC tags,
to the network.
Coorperation
A
C
D
B
Not polluted
Polluted
Fig. 2. An example illustrates how SpaceMac helps to detect pollution
attacks. Using SpaceMac, A and B are able to sign the expanding space
ΠC (the received space of C) and D is able to verify any packet sent by C
to see if it belongs to ΠC . If there is a packet sent by C that is not in ΠC ,
the attack is detected by D. The cooperation among A, B, and D helps to
detect the attack from C.
S A B C R
S A B C R(2)
(1) Coorperation
Not polluted
Polluted
Controller
Fig. 3. An example of inferring an attacker’s location using information
about polluted edges from [19]: The attacker is at node B. Scenarios (1) and
(2) correspond to the sets of polluted edges when the attacker lies and is
honest about its incoming subspace, respectively. The controller can narrow
down the attacker to two nodes: A and B, as they initiate polluted edges. The
cooperation among nodes in the network and the controller helps the locating
process.
To achieve the above goals, we design a defense system
which consists of two main components: the detection scheme
and the locating scheme. The detection scheme provides in-
network detection while the locating scheme provides exact lo-
cating. Both the detection scheme and locating scheme impose
little computing overhead as well as communication overhead.
The defense system as a whole is arbitrarily collusion resistant.
Fig. 1 illustrates the overall structure of our defense system.
IV. KEY OBSERVATIONS AND APPROACH OVERVIEW
In this section, we describe our key observations and how
we exploit these observations in our design of the detection
and locating schemes.
A. In-Network Detection
Previous work that uses homomorphic MACs to detect
corrupted packets, such as, the work by Agrawal and Boneh
[10], Li et al. [11], and Zhang et al. [18], leverage the
observation that if a packet does not belong to the source
space, then it is a corrupted packet. The detection works
by first establishing shared secret MAC keys between the
source and the intermediate nodes. Then, using these secret
keys, the source node can sign the fixed source space and the
intermediate nodes can verify if their received packets belong
to the source space.
Our detection scheme leverages a different observation: A
packet sent by an intermediate node must belong to the space
spanned by all packets that it received from its parents (Lemma
1). For example, consider a subset of nodes in a network in Fig.
2. At any moment in the multicast session, a packet sent by C
must belong to the space spanned by the packets it received
from its parents: A and B; otherwise, C must be polluting the
network. Formally, at any moment t in the multicast session, if
an intermediate node N sends out a vector y then y ∈ ΠN (t);
otherwise, y is corrupted.
We use SpaceMac to enable the parents of N to sign the
expanding space ΠN and the children of N to verify any
packet that N sends to see if it belongs to ΠN . The cooperation
of the parents of N and the children of N enables the children
to detect any corrupted packet sent by N immediately. For
example, in Fig. 2, at any time t, D is able to check if any
packet it receives from C belongs to ΠC(t); hence, D is able
to detect any pollution attempt by C as soon as D receives a
corrupted packet from C.
B. Exact Locating
Leveraging the cooperation between nodes in the network
and a central controller, Jafarisiavoshani et al. [19] have
shown that when there is a single pollution attacker, its location
can be narrowed down to a set of at most two nodes. This
is by analyzing the polluted edges identified based on the
incoming subspaces reported by all the nodes to the central
controller. An example is shown in Fig. 3. When there are
multiple attackers in a general network topology, the number
of suspected nodes increases to include the attackers and their
parents and children.
Our key observation here is that the uncertainty about
the location of the attackers originates from the fact that
the attackers can lie about their received spaces. Therefore,
by ensuring that all nodes in the network cannot lie about
their received spaces, we can exactly locate the attackers. For
instance, if the attacker cannot lie in the example given in Fig.
3, then the only possible scenario is scenario (2). Thus, one can
determine that the attacker is at node B. We explicitly design
and use SpaceMac to achieve this goal, i.e., prevent nodes
from lying. To prevent attacker B from lying, A cooperates
with the controller by signing the space spanned by the packets
it sends to B using SpaceMac. This is so that when B reports
a fake space, it will not have the proper signature of the fake
space to convince the controller.
V. THE CONSTRUCTION OF SPACEMAC
In this section, we describe the construction of SpaceMac.
This construction is new and significantly more efficient than
our old construction presented in [24]. This construction
is an improvement of the homomorphic MAC construction,
HomMac, proposed by Agrawal and Boneh [10]. The key
difference between SpaceMac and HomMac is the security
property that SpaceMac brings: SpaceMac allows for signing
spaces that expand over time, while HomMac only allows for
signing fixed spaces. This is directly reflected in the difference
between the security games of SpaceMac and HomMac,
and consequently the difference between the constructions.
SpaceMac improves and generalizes of HomMac. Therefore,
SpaceMac can also be used to sign fixed spaces as well, e.g.,
in the place of HomMac in the detection scheme in [10].
However, it is not possible to use HomMac to support either
our detection scheme or our locating scheme because any
intermediate node does not know about the entire source space
(to use Sign of HomMac) at the time of tag generation.
A. Definitions
A (q, n,m) homomorphic MAC scheme is defined by three
probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithms: Mac, Combine, and
Verify. The Mac algorithm generates a tag for a given vector;
the Combine algorithm computes a tag for a linear combina-
tion of some given vectors; and the Verify algorithm verifies
whether a tag is a valid tag of a given vector.
• Mac(k, id,y):
– Input: a secret key k, the identifier id of the source
space ΠS , and a vector y ∈ Fn+mq .
– Output: tag t for y.
• Combine((y1, t1, α1), · · · , (yp, tp, αp)):
– Input: p vectors y1, · · · ,yp, their tags t1, · · · , tp
under key k, and their coefficients α1, · · · , αp ∈ Fq .
– Output: tag t for vector y def=
∑p
i=1 αi yi.
• Verify(k, id,y, t):
– Input: a secret key k, the identifier id of the source
space ΠS , a vector y ∈ Fn+mq , and its tag t
– Output: 0 (reject) or 1 (accept)
Also, the scheme must satisfy the following correctness re-
quirement:
Verify
(
k, id,
p∑
i=1
αiyi,Combine((y1, t1, α1), · · · , (yp, tp, αp))
)
= 1.
B. Attack Game
We consider the following attack game for a homomorphic
MAC T = (Mac,Combine,Verify), a challenger C, and an
adversary A:
• Setup. C generates a random key k R← K
• Queries. A adaptively queries C, where each query is of
the form (id,y). For each query, C replies to A with the
corresponding tag t← Mac(k, id,y).
• Output. A eventually outputs a tuple (id∗,y∗, t∗).
Up to the time A outputs, it has queried C multiple times. Let
l denote the number of times A queried C using id∗ and get
tags for l vectors, y∗1, · · · ,y∗l, of these queries. Let y∗ =
(y
(1)
∗ , · · · , y(n+m)∗ ). We consider that the adversary wins the
security game if
(i) (y(n+1)∗ , · · · , y(n+m)∗ ) 6= 0 (trivial forge otherwise),
(ii) Verify(k, id∗,y∗, t∗) = 1 , and
(iii) y∗ /∈ span(y∗1, · · · ,y∗l) .
Let Adv[A, T ] denote the probability that A wins the above
attack game. We define a secure homomorphic MAC scheme
as follows:
Definition 2. A (q, n, m) homomorphic MAC scheme T is
secure if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A,
Adv[A, T ] is negligible.
C. Construction
Let K and D denote the domains of the keys and the
id’s of the spaces sent by the source, respectively. Let [n]
denote {1, · · · , n}. We use a pseudorandom generator (PRG)
G: KG → Fn+mq and a PRF F : KF × D × [m] → Fq . A
key k for this construction consists of a pair (k1, k2), where
k1 ∈ KG and k2 ∈ KF .
• Mac(k, id,y): A tag for a vector y = (y(1), · · · , y(n+m))
using key k = (k1, k2) is generated as follows:
– r← G(k1) ∈ Fn+mq
– b←∑mj=1 [y(n+j) · F (k2, id, j)] ∈ Fq
– t← (r · y) + b ∈ Fq
• Combine((y1, t1, α1), · · · , (yp, tp, αp)): The tag t of y
is computed as follows:
– t←∑pi=1 αi ti ∈ Fq
• Verify(k, id,y, t): To verify if t is the valid tag of y using
key k = (k1, k2), we proceed as follows:
– r← G(k1) ∈ Fn+mq
– b←∑mj=1 [y(n+j) · F (k2, id, j)] ∈ Fq
– a← r · y ∈ Fq
– If a+ b = t output 1; otherwise, output 0
The correctness of the scheme is proved as follows. Suppose
y = (y(1), · · · , y(n+m)) =
p∑
i=1
αiyi .
Then,
a+ b = r ·
p∑
i=1
αiyi +
m∑
j=1
[(
p∑
i=1
αiy
(n+j)
i
)
· F (k2, id, j)
]
=
p∑
i=1
αi
(r · yi) + m∑
j=1
(
y
(n+j)
i · F (k2, id, j)
) = p∑
i=1
αiti .
Compared to our old SpaceMac construction [24], this
construction is significantly more efficient. In particular, com-
pared to the old Mac and Verify algorithms, the new ones
use one additional PRG call but significantly less number of
PRF calls: m as opposed to n + m. Considering that a PRG
computation is more efficient than a PRF computation and that
in practice, n is typically an order of magnitude larger than
m, e.g., n = 2048,m = 128 in a live video streaming system
[25], this new construction is one order of magnitude more
computationally efficient.
Compared to HomMac [10], our construction replaces the
Sign algorithm, which generates tags for all basis vectors of a
fixed space, with the Mac algorithm, which generates a tag for
any vector in Fn+mq . The Combine algorithms show that tags
generated by our Mac algorithms can be combined to produce
a valid tag for an arbitrary linear combination. We note that
both our constructions can be considered as a generalization of
the scheme in [10] because the Mac algorithm can substitute
the Sign algorithm, i.e., it can generate valid, combinable tags
for all basis vectors.
D. Security
The security of SpaceMac is proven by assuming F is a
secure PRF and G is a secure PRG. Let B1 and B2 denote a
PRF adversary and a PRG adversary, respectively. Let PRF-
Adv[B1, F ] and PRG-Adv[B2, G] denote the advantages in
winning the PRF and PRG security games, respectively.1
1The definition of PRF and PRG security games can be found in [26].
Theorem 3. For any fixed q, n, m, SpaceMac is a secure
(q, n, m) homomorphic MAC assuming F is a secure PRF
and G is a secure PRG. In particular, for every homomorphic
MAC adversary A, there is a PRF adversary B1 and a PRG
adversary B2, who have similar running time to A, such that
Adv[A,SpaceMac] ≤ PRF-Adv[B1, F ]+PRG-Adv[B2, G]+1
q
.
Proof: The proof is by using a sequence of games denoted
as Game 0, 1, and 2. Let W0, W1, and W2 denote the events
that A wins the homomorphic MAC security in Game 0, 1 and
2, respectively. Let Game 0 be identical to the Attack Game.
Hence,
Pr[W0] = Adv[A,SpaceMac] . (1)
In Game 1, the PRG G is replaced by a truly random string,
i.e., to respond to the Mac query, the challenger computes
r
R← Fn+mq instead of r ← G(k1). Everything else remains
the same. Then, there exists a PRG adversary B2 such that
|Pr[W0]− Pr[W1]| = PRG-Adv[B2, G] . (2)
In Game 2, the PRF F is replaced by a truly random
function, i.e., to respond to the Mac query, the challenger
computes b←∑mj=1 [y(n+j) · s(j)], where s(j) R← Fq instead
of s(j) ← F (k2, id, j). Everything else remains the same.
Then, there exists a PRF adversary B1 such that
|Pr[W1]− Pr[W2]| = PRF-Adv[B1, F ] . (3)
The complete challenger in Game 2 works as follows:
Initialization. r R← Fn+mq
Queries. A adaptively queries C, where each query is of the
form (id,y). C replies to query i of A as follows:
if id is never used in any of the previous queries:
s
(j)
i
R← Fq for j = 1, · · · ,m
else:
s
(j)
i ’s := the ones used in the previous response
send t := (r · y) +∑mj=1 [y(n+j) · s(j)]
Output. A eventually outputs a tuple (id∗,y∗, t∗). To deter-
mine if A wins the game we compute
if id∗ = idi (for some i) then // case (i)
set s(j)∗ := s
(j)
i for j = 1, · · · ,m
else // case (ii)
set s(j)∗
R← Fq for j = 1, · · · ,m
Let l denote the number of times A queried C using id∗ and get
tags for l vectors, y∗1, · · · ,y∗l, of these queries. We consider
that the adversary wins the game, i.e., event W2 happens, if
(y
(n+1)
∗ , · · · , y(n+m)∗ ) 6= 0 , (4)
t∗ = (r · y∗) +
m∑
j=1
[
y
(n+j)
∗ · s(j)∗
]
, and (5)
y∗ /∈ span(y∗1, · · · ,y∗l) . (6)
In the following steps, we show that Pr[W2] = 1q . Let T be
the event that A outputs the tuple with a completely new id∗,
i.e., A never made queries using id∗ before.
• When T happens, i.e., in case (ii), since s(j)∗ ’s are in-
distinguishable from random values in Fq , and y(n+j)∗ ’s
are not all zeros, the right hand side of equation (5) is
a completely random value in Fq , independent of the
adversary’s view. Thus,
Pr[W2 ∧ T ] = 1
q
Pr[T ] . (7)
• When T does not happen, i.e., in case (i), s(j)∗ of
equation (5) have been used to generate tags for vectors
y∗1, · · · ,y∗l. In this case, we will proceed by showing
that when y∗ /∈ span(y∗1, · · · ,y∗l), the right hand side
of equation (5) looks indistinguishable from a random
value in Fq . To this end, let Π = span(y∗1, · · · ,y∗l),
and d be the dimension of Π. Note that d < n +
m because otherwise Π = Fn+mq , which implies
y∗ ∈ Π. Let {b1, · · · ,bd} be a basis of Π. Denote
aug(y) as the augmentation of vector y, i.e., aug(y) =
(y(n+1), · · · , y(n+m)) .
Case (a): Consider the case when aug(y∗) can be
expressed as a linear combination of aug(bi), i ∈ [1, d].
Let aug(y∗) =
∑d
i=1 αi aug(bi) for some αi. If we let
y′ =
∑d
i=1 αi bi, then the valid tag of y’ for the same
space id∗ as y∗ is
t′ = (r · y′) +
m∑
j=1
[
(
d∑
i=1
αi bi)
(n+j) · s(j)∗
]
= (r · y′) +
m∑
j=1
[
y
(n+j)
∗ · r(j)∗
]
(8)
By subtracting equation (8) from (5), we know that by
producing a valid forgery, the adversary found a y∗ and
t∗ that satisfy the following equation:
t∗ − t′ = r · (y∗ − y′) (9)
However, since y∗ 6= y′ (y′ is in Π but y∗ is not), and r
is indistinguishable from a random vector in Fn+mq , the
probability that he can satisfy (9) is exactly 1q .
Case (b): Consider the case when aug(y∗) cannot be
expressed as a linear combination of aug(bi)’s. In this
case, we proceed by showing that given a fixed y∗, from
the perspective of the adversary, the valid tag t∗ of y∗ is
indistinguishable from a random value in Fq:
Let s(i)∗ , i ∈ [1,m], be the unknowns, and s =
(s
(1)
∗ , · · · , s(m)∗ ). By the previous l queries, the adver-
sary learns the following system of l equations and m
unknowns:
(I)

aug(y∗1) · s = ty∗1 − r · y∗1
· · ·
aug(y∗l) · s = ty∗l − r · y∗l
Since {b1, · · · ,bd} is a basis of Π =
span(y∗1, · · · ,y∗l), the above system is equivalent
to the following system of d equations:
(II)

aug(b1) · s = u1
· · ·
aug(bd) · s = ud
where each uj is a linear combination of right-hand-side
values of the equations of system (I).
Let Π′ = span(aug(b1), · · · , aug(bd)) and d′ be the
dimension of Π′. Note that d′ ≤ d. Let {c1, · · · , cd′} be
a basis of Π′. Note that since aug(y∗) /∈ Π′, aug(y∗)
cannot be expressed as a linear combination of ci’s. The
system of equations (II) is equivalent to the following
system of d′ equations:
(III)

c1 · s = e1
· · ·
cd′ · s = ed′
where each ej is a linear combination of right-hand-side
values of the equations of system (II). A valid tag t∗ of
y∗ satisfies the following equation:
aug(y∗) · s = t∗ − r · y∗ . (10)
Without loss of generality, assume that the adversary
knows r. Note that d < m otherwise aug(y∗) ∈
span(bi). Since d′ ≤ d, it follows that d′ < m. The
system of m unknowns and d′ + 1 linear equations, d′
from (III) and 1 from (10), is consistent regardless of the
value of t∗ because the coefficient matrix, whose rows are
linearly independent vectors: c1, · · · , cd′ , and aug(y∗),
has rank d′ + 1 ≤ m. Furthermore, for any value t∗, the
the solution space always has size qm−d
′−1. Thus, for a
fixed y∗, its valid tag, t∗, could be any value in Fq equally
likely, given that s(i)∗ ’s are chosen uniformly at random
from Fq . Hence, the probability of forging a valid tag t∗
is 1q .
By the result of case (a) and case (b),
Pr[W2 ∧ ¬T ] = 1
q
.Pr[¬T ] . (11)
• From equations (7) and (11), we have
Pr[W2] = Pr[W2 ∧ T ] + Pr[W2 ∧ ¬T ] = 1
q
. (12)
Equations (1), (2), (3), and (12) together prove the theorem.
Theorem 3 states that an adversary A can break the scheme
with probability 1q . For a small field size, e.g., q = 2
8,
the security of the MAC scheme may be unsatisfactory. To
improve the security, one could either increase the field size
or use multiple tags as suggested in [10] and [11]. The security
of our scheme using l tags is ( 1q )
l. As observed in [11], it is
preferable to use multiple tags instead of increasing the field
size. This is because in order to achieve the same security
( 1q )
l, using the field size ql instead of using l tags increases
the computational complexity of field multiplication by log l
times.
R2
S
A C
B
D
ER1
Polluted
Not polluted
Fig. 4. A network consisting of 8 nodes (resembling a network given in [19]).
B is the attacker. After every node (except for S) reports to the controller its
true incoming spaces, B is identified as the attacker since it has no incoming
polluted edge but has one outgoing polluted edge.
VI. DETECTION SCHEME
In this section, we describe our detection scheme in detail.
Our scheme exploits the observation outlined in Section IV-A
to provide in-network detection. In particular, parents and chil-
dren of an intermediate node N cooperate through SpaceMac
to detect any corrupted packet sent by N in a timely manner.
For ease of presentation, we describe the detection scheme
within the scope of a single generation, i.e., considering a
single source space id.
1) Assumptions. We assume that there is a controller who
knows the complete topology of the graph. The controller
could be the source itself. This assumption is also made in
recent work by Li et al. [11]. We further assume that each node
N shares with the controller a pair of secret keys (k1N , k
2
N ).
These keys can be established with the help of a Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI). We note that recent proposed schemes
which use homormorphic MACs also made assumption about
the existence of a PKI [11], [18] or the existence of shared
secret keys [10]. In general, the problem of establishing
shared secret keys is a challenging problem of its own and
is orthogonal to this work.
2) Bootstrapping. First, for every intermediate node N ,
the controller determines the key kN¯ , which will be secret to N
itself and is used by the parents and children of N when using
SpaceMac. Each node can serve as either a parent or a child;
therefore, each node, depending on its position in the network,
requires to know a different set of keys to participate in the
detection scheme. For example, consider the network in Fig.
4, node D needs to know kA¯, kB¯ , and kC¯ to detect corrupted
packets sent by A, B and C, respectively. It also needs to
know kE¯ to help R1 and R2 to detect corrupted packets sent
by E.
Second, the source and all the receivers need to share an
end-to-end key, k∗. This key is used to ensure detection in
the presence of colluding adversaries, in which case a node
N colludes with its parent to obtain kN¯ and thus can bypass
the verification of its children. We defer the discussion about
multiple adversaries to Section VIII-B, where we analyze
different colluding scenarios in depth.
The controller then sends to each node N a bootstrap-
ping packet consisting of the set of keys that are necessary
for it to participate in the detection scheme. In particular,
the controller construct the bootstrapping packet bN : bN =
{kX¯,X∈{PN∪CN}, k∗} . Note that bN contains k∗ if and only
if N is either the source or a receiver. The controller then sends
bN to N through a secure and authenticated channel achieved
with k1N (for encryption) and k
2
N (for authentication) using
a standard encrypt-then-authenticate algorithm2. For example,
node D in Fig. 4 receives {kA¯, kB¯ , kC¯ , kE¯} while node R1
receives {kA¯, kD¯, kE¯ , k∗}.
We note that the MAC keys k∗ and kX¯ can be used
for multiple source space/generations. This is because, by
construction, SpaceMac takes into account generation iden-
tifiers when computing tags. As a result, the overhead of a
key establishment is per multiple generations as opposed to
per single generation. Hence, this overhead is asymptotically
negligible in the number of generations.
Finally, if each node knows its own 2-hop neighborhood
information, then the MAC keys can also be bootstrapped
without the help of the controller. In particular, by using a
secure key distribution scheme for ad-hoc networks, such as
[27], the source can establish the shared secret MAC key k∗
with the receivers, and for a node N , a parent P can establish
a shared secret MAC key kN¯ with the parents and children of
N .
3) Sending and Coding. Before sending out the each
source packet, vi, the source S calculates an end-to-end tag,
tk
∗
vi , using the Mac algorithm of SpaceMac with key k
∗:
tk
∗
vi = Mac(vi, k
∗) . S then attaches this tag to every source
packet and sends wi , {tk∗vi ||vi} instead of vi, where ‘||’
denotes concatenation. The packets traversing the network
are linear combinations of wi’s instead of vi’s. For ease of
presentation with regards to the input length of the SpaceMac
algorithms, assume that the size of wi is still n.
Consider a parent P who wants to send a packet y to its
child N . P needs to calculate a helper tag which helps the
children of N to detect corrupted packets sent by N . In partic-
ular, before sending y to N , P needs to calculate a MAC tag,
t
kN¯
y , using Mac under key kN¯ : t
kN¯
y = Mac(y, kN¯ ) . Besides
the helper tag, P must also pass along a verification tag of y,
which is used by N to verify the integrity of y. Assume P
received {y1, · · · ,yl} and their helper tags {tkP¯y1 , · · · , tkP¯yl }
from its parents, and P computes y as y =
∑l
i=1 αiyi.
Then, the verification tag, tkP¯y , of y can be computed using
Combine: tkP¯y = Combine((y1, t
kP¯
y1 , α1), · · · , (yl, tkP¯yl , αl)) .
The final packet that P sends to N includes y and its helper
and verification tags: {tkN¯y || tkP¯y ||y} .
We note that if a node is benign, besides explicitly calcu-
lating the helper tag, it would code and send packets in a way
identical to what it does normally. The verification tag will be
computed correctly because the Combine algorithm linearly
combines the tags in the same way the packets are combined,
i.e., with the same set of coefficients.
4) Receiving and Verification. When a node N receives
from its parent P a packet {tkN¯y || tkP¯y ||y}, it uses kP¯ and
the Verify algorithm to verify the integrity of the packet. The
packet is deemed non-corrupted if Verify(kP¯ ,y, t
kP¯
y ) = 1 .
The security guarantee comes from the security of SpaceMac:
since P does not know kP¯ , the probability that P can forge
a valid tag, tkP¯y , when y is outside of its received space, ΠP ,
is 1q . As a result, as soon as N receives a corrupted packet
2We refer the reader to Chapter 4.9 in [26] for more details on encrypt-
then-authenticate algorithms.
from P , with high probability, N is able to detect the attack
immediately.
In the case N is a receiver, it further verifies the end-to-
end tag using key k∗. Parse y as {tk∗w ||w}. N accepts w if
Verify(k∗,w, tk
∗
w ) = 1 . The security guarantee, again, comes
from the security of SpaceMac: since none of the malicious
intermediate node knows k∗, if w is outside of the source
space, the adversary can only forge a valid tag of w, tk
∗
w , with a
negligible probability of 1q . This second level of verification is
to provide a detection mechanism in the presence of colluding
adversaries.
VII. LOCATING SCHEME
Locating the attackers to eventually eliminate them is a
logical step after a pollution attack is detected. In this section,
we describe in detail how we exploit the observation made
in Section IV-B to exactly locate the pollution attackers. The
main idea is to force nodes to truthfully report their received
spaces to correctly identify polluted edges, thereby enabling
the exact identification of the location of the attackers.
A. Overview
1) Reporting. The following lemma, originally presented
in [28] and [19], implies that for each received subspace, ΠPN ,
from a parent P , node N may report a randomly chosen
packet, yr, of the space instead of the space itself; and by
checking if yr ∈ ΠS , the controller can determine if ΠPN ⊆ ΠS
to identify the polluted edges.
Lemma 4 (Jafarisiavoshani et al. [19], [28]). Let Π1 and Π2
be two subspaces of Fn+mq and assume that yr is a randomly
selected packet from Π1. Let d12 and d1 are the dimensions
of Π1∩Π2 and Π1, respectively. With probability 1−qd12−d1 ,
yr ∈ Π2 if and only if Π1 ⊆ Π2.
2) Using SpaceMac. We use SpaceMac to prevent nodes
from lying about their received spaces as follows. To enforce
a node N to report a true received space, ΠPN , that it received
from its parent, P , the parent P and the controller cooperate
so that the controller only accepts reported packets belonging
to but not outside of ΠPN . In particular, whenever P sends a
vector yi to N , it generates a tag, tyi , of yi using the Mac
algorithm with a secret key shared by P and the controller.
Then, when N reports yr, if yr is a linear combination of
vectors that it received from P , yi’s, then N can generate a
valid tag for yr by using the Combine algorithm on the tags
of yi’s that it received; if yr is not a linear combination of
yi’s then N can forge a valid tag for yr with only a negligible
probability of 1q .
3) Non-Repudiation Transmission Protocol. As pre-
sented, SpaceMac forces nodes to report only true received
subspaces since it is computationally difficult to forge valid
tags otherwise. However, it does not prevent a malicious node
from sending invalid tags to its children to prevent the children
from reporting polluted spaces.
For example, an attacker P can send a polluted packet ye /∈
ΠS and a bogus tag te to its child N . When N reports the
space ΠPN , if the randomly chosen vector yr was formed by
a linear combination involving ye, then the aggregated tag tr
of yr that N generates using the Combine algorithm will be
invalid due to the bogus tag te. As a result, the controller will
reject yr. Consequently, the attacker P successfully prevents
its benign child N from reporting the polluted space ΠPN .
To address this, we utilize an efficient non-repudiation
transmission protocol proposed by Wang et al. [20]. For a
parent P and a child N , the controller generates a set of secret
keys, denoted by X , based on the private key of the parent
and the ID N of the child. After that, the controller randomly
selects a set of keys Y from X based on the private key of
the child and the ID P of the parent; then, it sends Y to the
child. We denote X \ Y as Y; also, let λ , |X | and δ , |Y|.
When sending a packet, P generates λ tags (instead of one)
using the Mac algorithm and all keys in X . When receiving
a packet, N uses its set of keys Y and the Verify algorithm
to verify δ out of λ tags. Finally, when receiving a randomly
chosen packet yr chosen from ΠPN and its λ tags from the N ,
the controller uses all keys in Y and the Verify algorithm to
verify all λ−δ tags. The controller, in this case, keeps track of
a counter θ, θ ≤ λ− δ. If at least θ tags pass the verification
then the controller accepts the report.
The following two lemmas provide the security of the
non-repudiation transmission protocol when applying to our
context. Lemma 5 is identical to Theorem 1 in [20]. Lemma
6 is an adapted version of Theorem 2 in [20] – the difference
is that in our case, a node does not report a packet that it
receives, but it reports a linear combination of packets that it
receives instead.
Lemma 5 (Non-repudiation of the receiver–Wang et al. [20]).
The probability that a malicious child node can successfully
report to the controller that its parent sends it a packet y,
which is never sent by the parent, is at most
λ−δ∑
i=θ
(
λ− δ
i
)
1
qi
(
1− 1
q
)λ−δ−i
.
Lemma 6 (Non-repudiation of the sender–Wang et al. [20]).
The probability that a malicious parent can make the con-
troller reject the parent’s space reported by its child by sending
the child some packets with invalid tags is at most
max
0≤x≤δ+θ−1
p(x), where p(x) ≤
min(δ,x)∑
i=max(x−θ+1,0)
(
δ
i
) (
λ−δ
x−i
)(
λ
x
)
qδ−i
.
The proofs of these two lemmas are provided in the Ap-
pendix. Finally, we note that both of the above probabilities
can be made very small by choosing appropriate values for
q, λ, δ, and θ. Examples of values for these parameters and
the corresponding probabilities are provided in Table III. The
choice of parameters can then be made based on the desired
tradeoff between the overhead and the probability that the
attacker succeeds.
4) Locating the Attackers. After the controller collects
the true subspaces from every node, we proceed similar to the
approach by Jafarisiavoshani et al. [19] to locate the attackers.
Here, we discuss the case when there is a single attacker. We
defer the case when there are multiple attackers to Section
VIII-B.
In [19], the authors have shown that in a general network
which has a single adversary, the location of the adversary can
be narrowed down to a set of at most two nodes in both cases
where the adversary inject corrupted packets to either one
downstream edge or multiple downstream edges. This is done
by partitioning the edges into two set: the set of polluted edges,
Ep, and non-polluted edges, Es, then analyzing the nodes with
respect to the identified Ep and Es. They also note that the
partitioning of Ep and Es is not unique since the adversary
might lie, which results in the uncertainty about the location
of the attacker.
Fortunately, when the partition reflects the real state of
pollution of the edges in the network, i.e., when the adversary
is forced to report its true incoming spaces, the adversary is
always the node that has no incoming edge belonging to Ep
but has at least one outgoing edge belonging to Ep. Fig. 4
shows the case where B is an attacker whom get identified
because it has no incoming polluted edge but one outgoing
polluted edge.
Using our scheme, the probability that the attacker lies about
its incoming spaces is very small (Lemma 5). Furthermore,
the probability that the attacker can prevent its children from
reporting the subspaces polluted by itself is very small, too
(Lemma 6). As a result, with high probability (depending on
q, λ, δ, and θ), our scheme can produce an unambiguous
partitioning of Ep and Es, which helps to precisely locate the
attacker.
B. Full Description
To distinguish cryptographic keys used in the detection
scheme and keys used in the locating scheme, we decorate
any key used in the locating scheme with an overhead bar,
e.g., k¯.
1) Assumptions. Similar to the assumptions we made in
the detection scheme, we assume that there is a controller
(could be the source itself) who knows the complete topology
and the source space. This assumption is also made in recently
proposed locating schemes [19], [20]. We assume that each
node N shares a triplet of secret keys (k¯1N , k¯
2
N , k¯
3
N ) with the
controller (with the help of a PKI). We further assume that
each node knows the identifiers of its adjacent nodes (can be
bootstrapped by the controller). In addition, we assume that
there is a reliable low-bandwidth end-to-end communication
path between the controller and each node (the channel for
the reports and the announcement by the controller). Other
locating schemes, such as, [19] and [20], implicitly made this
assumption.
2) Bootstrapping. Let N be the set of IDs of adjacent
downstream nodes of P . For N ∈ N , the controller generates
a set XPN of λ keys using a PRF F1: K × I × [λ ] → K,
where K is the domain of key k¯1P , and I is the domain of
the identifiers of the nodes: XPN ← {F1(k¯1P , N, i), for i =
1, · · · , λ} . Note that P can compute XPN itself as it knows
k¯1P and its neighbors’ identifiers.
For N ∈ N , consider an array L whose elements are distinct
subsets of size δ of XPN . Note that L has length
(
λ
δ
)
. The
controller uses another PRF F2: K×I → [
(
λ
δ
)
] to select from
L a subset of size δ: YPN = L[i], where i ← F2(k¯1N , P ).
The controller then sends YPN to node N through a secure
and authenticated channel achieved with k¯2N (for encryption)
and k¯3N (for authentication) using an encrypt-then-authenticate
algorithm. Note that similar to k∗ and kX¯ , the sets of keys
XPN and YPN can be used across multiple generations.
Denote XPN \ YPN as YPN .
3) Sending and Receiving. Let id be the identifier of the
current source space ΠS . When a node P sends a packet y to
its downstream node N , beside the id, it has to send along λ
tags, which are computed using the Mac algorithm and keys
in XPN . Let GPN (y) denote this set of tags. Node P sends
(id,y,GPN (y)). When node N receives this packet from node
P , it uses YPN and the Verify algorithm to check the validity
of δ out of λ tags of GPN (y). It drops y as long as there is an
invalid tag. Otherwise, it stores the received tuple in its buffer.
4) Pollution Detection and Alert. A detection of the
pollution is needed to start the locating process. Here, we use
our detection scheme to provide the detection. Nevertheless,
we stress that our locating scheme does not depend on any
particular detection scheme. Using our detection scheme, a
node N , upon detecting a pollution, sends an alert (id || N )
to the controller through an authenticated channel achieved
using a traditional MAC scheme, e.g., HMAC, and shared key
k¯3N . When the controller receives an alert, it determines if
id is reported before, if so, it ignores the alert. Otherwise, it
sends a request (id) to each node N through an authenticated
channel achieved with HMAC and k¯3N . This request demands
each node to report its incoming subspaces.
5) Reporting Subspaces. Upon receiving the request (id)
from the controller, each node N checks if it receives a
similar request for the same id before, if it does, it ignores the
request. Otherwise, it prepares the report as follows: For each
parent node P , let (y1, t1,1, · · · , t1,λ), · · · , (yl, tl,1, · · · , tl,λ)
be packets of source space id and their tags that node N
received from node P . Node N sends to the controller through
an authenticated channel achieved with HMAC and k¯3N the
report (N ||P ||yr || t1 || · · · || tλ), where αi R← Fq (i ∈ [l]);
yr =
∑l
i=1 αiyi; tj =
∑l
i=1 αiti,j (j ∈ [λ]).
6) Locating the Attackers. After sending out the requests,
the controller waits for the reports. After ∆t seconds, it starts
identifying the pollution attackers. It classifies any node that
does not report all of its incoming spaces as a malicious node.
It only accepts reports with at least θ valid SpaceMac tags,
where the validation uses keys in YPN ’s. It then identifies the
polluted edges in the network based on the reported spaces and
the source space. We note that checking if a reported space is
polluted can be done quickly and efficiently in O(mn) in terms
of multiplication operations by leveraging the global coding
coefficients of the reported packet and the source packets.
Finally, any node that does not have a polluted incoming edge
but has a polluted outgoing edge is classified as malicious.
7) Releasing the Result. After identifying the set of
attackers A, the controller sends (A) to each benign node N
through an authenticated channel achieved with HMAC and
key k¯3N . Upon receiving (A), each node N adds the nodes inA
into its blacklist. Every node in the network will neither send
nor receive traffic from nodes in its blacklist in subsequent
communication. The controller itself removes nodes in A as
well as incoming and outgoing edges of these nodes from
the network topology. Note that the MAC keys used in the
detection scheme do not need to be refreshed when a node is
removed from the network. This is because the parent-child
relationship between any pair of the remaining adjacent nodes
is the same as before the removal.
VIII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Single Adversary
We described how our our detection and locating scheme
work when there is a single adversary when we describe our
schemes. We refer the reader to Section VI and Section VII
for the details.
B. Multiple Adversaries
1) Detection Scheme:
a. Independent Adversaries: We consider adversaries as
independent when every adversary checks the integrity of the
packets it receives from its parents and drop corrupted packets.
This scenario is similar to the single adversary scenario. In-
network detection works because if a node N wants to pollute
the network, it still has to forge a valid SpaceMac verification
tag for a packet that lies outside of its received space ΠN ,
which is computationally difficult.
b. Colluding Adversaries: We first consider the passive
colluding scenario, where there is an adversary who does not
drop corrupted packets that it receives from its parents. In this
scenario, in-network detection no longer works. To see this,
consider the case where N receives from one of its parents,
P , a corrupted packet {tkN¯y || tkP¯y ||y} with correct helper tag,
t
kN¯
y , and invalid verification tag, t
kP¯
y , and N does not drop
this packet. To propagate the pollution to its child C, it simply
computes an appropriate helper tag, tkC¯y , for this packet using
kC¯ , then forward the packet {tkC¯y || tkN¯y ||y} to C. Clearly, tkN¯y
is a valid tag for y; hence, y passes C verification, and tkC¯y
is a valid helper tag for y which will pass any verification by
a child of C.
We now consider the active colluding scenario, where a
node N can collude with one of its parents, P , to learn about
the private key, kN¯ , that is used for verification by its children.
In this scenario, in-network detection also fails. This is because
knowing the secret key, kN¯ , N can generate a valid verification
tag for any packet outside of its received space ΠN ; thus, any
child C of N would not be able to detect corrupted packets
sent by N .
Note that in both cases where the in-network detection
fails, the adversaries must be adjacent to each other. In
both of these cases, the end-to-end detection made by the
receivers comes to the rescue. This end-to-end detection is
reliable because the receivers are trusted and the private key
k∗ shared by the source and the receivers is not known to
any adversary. In order to pass the verification done by the
receivers, an adversary has to forge a valid SpaceMac tag
which is computationally difficult. We discuss how we could
relax the assumption of trusted receivers in Section VIII-E.
2) Locating Scheme:
In the presence of multiple adversaries, an attacker may be “in
the shadow” of some other attackers, which means that it may
pollute only already polluted data and thus does not produce
any detectable effect. More precisely, we define shadowed and
exposed attackers below.
Definition 3 (Adapted from [19] and [20]). An attacker is
shadowed if it has at least one polluted incoming edge and is
exposed otherwise.
a. Independent Adversaries: In this case, we note that with
high probability, our approach is already able to identify all
exposed attackers. We utilize the following observation to
identify all shadowed and exposed attackers.
Lemma 7. For any directed acyclic graph with pollution
attack in presence, there is at least one exposed attacker.
Proof: Consider a topological ordering of the graph, the
first malicious node in the ordering is an exposed attacker.
Exploiting this, we can use multiple generations, i.e., trans-
missions of (different) source spaces, to identify all attackers.
Lemma 8. In a network with η independent attackers. With
high probability (depending on q, λ, δ, and θ), all attackers
can be identified after κ generations which experience pollu-
tion attack, where κ ≤ η.
Proof: Since there is at least one exposed attacker per
generation by Lemma 7, our scheme can identify at least
one attacker per generation. Because the identified attackers
are immediately excluded from future communication and the
other attackers are persistent, subsequent identified attackers
are different from the already identified ones. Therefore, it
takes at most η generations to identify all η attackers.
Note that we consider the cases where there exists an
attacker who is disconnected from the receivers after the
removal of all other attackers as degenerate cases. This is
because the disconnected attacker is no longer able to pollute
the network. In this case, the location of all attackers cannot
be determined.
b. Colluding Adversaries: We note that each pair of parent
P and child N uses distinct key sets XPN and YPN ; thus,
the collusion of malicious nodes does not provide knowledge
about the key sets of benign nodes. However, when the
distance between any two attackers equals to one, where
distance refers to the length of the shortest path connecting
two nodes, these attackers can collude to report a false space.
Assume that in a network, there are colluding attackers
P and N connected by a directed edge e(P,N) and there
is no other pair of attackers in the network having distance
one. We ask the question: “What can P and N achieve by
manipulating edge e(P,N)?” Consider a topological ordering
O of the nodes. If N makes e(P,N) ∈ Ep, the set of
polluted edges identified by the controller, then P will be
exposed and identified after all malicious nodes that come
before P in O are identified. After P is located, N and the
rest of the attackers will be eventually located. Otherwise, if N
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Fig. 5. An example where there are three attackers A, B, and E. Attackers
A and B collude to make edge e(B,A), which is polluted, non-polluted.
Nevertheless, all are identified after 3 generations.
makes e(P,N) ∈ Es, the set of non-polluted edges identified
by the controller, then N will be exposed and located after
all malicious nodes that come before N in O are located.
Analogous to the other case, after N is located, P (if not
already located) and the rest of the attackers will be eventually
located. Consequently, by manipulating the status of edge
e(P,N), the attackers can, at best, change the order in which
P and N are located. The above analysis can be extended
to the general case where there are multiple pairs having
distances one by considering the pair (P,N), where N has
a polluted outgoing edge, that appears first in O first. Fig. 5
shows an example. As a result, we can generalize lemma 8:
Lemma 9. In a network with η attackers. With high probability
(depending on q, λ, δ, and θ), all attackers can be identified
after κ generations which experience pollution attack, where
κ ≤ η.
C. Tag-Pollution Resistance
As pointed out by Li et al. [11], a scheme that uses multiple
MAC tags, such as [10], [17], may suffer from tag pollution
attacks. In these schemes, a packet carries multiple tags and
each node only has keys to verify a subset of them; therefore,
an adversary may tamper with some of the tags which only get
verified far down the information flow. The consequence is that
a packet with some corrupted tags may pass the verification
of a few level of nodes. When mixed with other packets, one
corrupted tag may snowball into a large number of corrupted
tags. The packets carrying these corrupted tags eventually fail
the authentication down the stream, thus wasting resources of
the network. This effectively emulates a pollution attack.
Both our detection scheme and locating scheme use mul-
tiple MAC tags; fortunately, our schemes are resistant to tag
pollution attack. More specifically, in our detection scheme,
each packet carries three tags: one end-to-end tag, one helper
tag, and one verification tag. An adversary cannot tamper with
the end-to-end tag because the verification tag of a packet is
computed over the concatenation of both the content of the
packet and its end-to-end tag. In other words, if the adversary
tampers with the end-to-end tag of a packet, the packet will not
pass the verification test made by the immediate downstream
nodes. This idea of using nested tags was originally introduced
in [11]. Apparently, the adversary cannot tamper with the
verification tag of a packet since this verification tag is checked
immediately by one of its children. Finally, the adversary may
tamper with the helper tag of a packet it sends to its child,
e.g., attaches an erroneous helper tag. In this case, since the
child uses the helper tag to compute verification tags for its
outgoing packets, any packet involving the packet with an
erroneous helper tag, sent by the child, will have a corrupted
verification tag. The next hop that receives packets from
this child will drop any packet with a corrupted verification
tag. Note that no other tags, besides the end-to-end tags,
travel more than two hops in our detection scheme. This
eliminates the scenarios where tags are only verified far down
the stream as in a tag pollution attack. Our locating scheme
uses λ tags; however, these tags are never forwarded to any
next hop other than the controller (only during the locating
process). Furthermore, Lemma 6 ensures that an adversary
can only trick the controller by sending erroneous tags with
negligible probability. As a result, our locating scheme is also
not susceptible to tag pollution attacks.
D. Denial of Service Attack
In our locating scheme, once received an alert of pollution
from one of the node, the controller triggers the locating
process. This involves collecting report vectors from every
node in the network. An adversary can exhaust the resource of
the network by flooding the controller with alerts. Our locating
scheme can combat this denial of service attack in a couple of
ways. Recall that the locating process is only triggered once
per generation since the controller only issues one request of
report per unique generation id. This already limits the effect
of the attack. In addition, the controller can maintain a counter,
ctr, per node. Every time a node N report (id ||N) and it
turns out that there is no polluted edge, ctr is incremented.
The controller then ignore any report from N for a period of
time if ctr exceeds a certain threshold τ . After this period of
time, the counter resets. Note that a malicious node N cannot
pretend to be another node N ′ when sending an alert, i.e.,
sending (id ||N ′) because the alert will be authenticated by the
controller using the private key, k¯3N ′ shared by the controller
and node N ′.
E. Malicious Receivers
The assumption that the receivers are trustworthy safeguards
our detection scheme against the scenarios where there are
adjacent colluding adversaries. Here we discuss several avail-
able options we could adopt when we relax this assumption
and consider the case where some (but not all) receivers are
malicious.
One option is to use a separate key for each receiver. When
some of the receivers are malicious, it is necessary for the
source to share with each receiver, Ri, a separate secret key,
k∗i , instead of having all receivers and the source share a
single key k∗. This is because if only one key k∗ is used,
a malicious receiver can leak the key to an intermediate node;
as a result, this node can generate a valid end-to-end tag
for any corrupted packet. For this option, for each k∗i , the
source generates a different end-to-end SpaceMac tag; thus, an
honest receiver is still able to detect the pollution attack. This
approach clearly increases the communication overhead of the
end-to-end detection by |R| times as a packet now carries |R|
end-to-end tags instead of one. This option works when the
number of receivers in the network is small.
Another option is to allow alternative ways of detection.
Recall that our location scheme works independently of any
detection scheme used. If an honest receiver, R, receives a
corrupted packet, besides relying on the end-to-end MAC
tag to detect corruption, it can also use other knowledge for
detection. For instance, as soon as the packets R received
form an inconsistent system of equations, R knows there is
an attack. Also, R can rely on application-level information
to determine corrupted packets. For instance, assume R is
able to solve the system but it gets corrupted packets after
solving the system, and assume that this is a video packet. The
corrupted packet is very likely not compliant with the expected
video codec. Using this application-level information, R can
detect the pollution as well. As soon as R detects the pollution
attack and alerts the controller, the locating process kicks in.
Recall that for any generation which experiences a pollution
attack, our locating scheme can eliminate at least one attacker.
A round of elimination by the locating scheme may break
the adjacency property of the attackers, thus enabling the in-
network detection to work in the next generation.
IX. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our detection
and locating schemes. We also compare the overhead of
our schemes to recently proposed schemes. In addition, we
implement SpaceMac as an open-source library and we make
it available online. Finally, we simulate the scenario when
there are multiple adversaries and show that our locating
scheme can eliminate all of them within a few generations.
A. Key Management Overhead
We compare the number of MAC keys that each verifying
node needs to maintain in our defense system to that required
by state-of-the-art schemes. We start by comparing the over-
head of our detection scheme to those of the other MAC-based
detection schemes [10], [11]. Similar to our detection scheme,
the schemes in [10] and [11] also require each node to manage
multiple keys. The number of keys could be large in both
[10] and [11]. In particular, in [10], the number of keys each
node maintains is, on average, no less than exp(c+1)
2ln(|V|−1)
c+1 ,
where c is the colluding parameter. Hence, the larger c is,
and/or the larger the number of nodes the network has, the
more keys are needed. In RIPPLE [11], keys expire quickly
periodically, and new keys are needed frequently; the number
of keys increases linearly in the number of time intervals, as
the transmission progresses. Clearly, the more time it takes
to transmit a generation, and/or the more generations are
transmitted, the larger the number of keys is needed. Standing
in stark contrast to [10] and [11], the number of keys a node
needs to manage in our detection scheme neither depends on
the transmission time nor c: it equals to the number of the
parents and children the node has (plus one). The number of
children and parents of a node may or may not depend on the
network size, depending on the network topology. Finally, the
number of keys needed for our locating scheme is equal to
that of the scheme in [20]. However, we stress that our keys
can be used for multiple generations while this is not the case
in [20] due to replay attacks).
Scheme Overhead (bits) In-network Detection Collusion Resistance Tag Pollution Resistance
Our scheme 3 dlog2qe Yes Yes, arbitrary resistance Yes
RIPPLE [11] `
2
dlog2qe Yes Yes, arbitrary resistance Yes
Broadcast MAC [10] |B|dlog2qe Yes Yes, c resistance No
TABLE II
Communication overhead of detection schemes which use homomorphic MACs along with the supported features
q λ δ θ Pr[P ] Pr[N ] Space Overhead
28 19 9 3 2−10 2−17 20 bytes
28 24 12 3 2−14 2−16 25 bytes
28 29 14 4 2−16 2−21 30 bytes
TABLE III
The probability a malicious parent succeeds in preventing its child to report,
Pr[P ], the probability a malicious child succeeds in disparaging its parent,
Pr[N ], and the space overhead correspond to different parameter sets.
B. Communication Overhead
Communication overhead refers to the additional network
bandwidth that our schemes introduce to the system. For both
of the schemes, we neglect the bandwidth of the bootstrapping
phase, where symmetric keys are distributed, as this can be
done offline.
Detection scheme. For the online overhead per packet,
our detection scheme requires each packet to carry three
SpaceMac tags: an end-to-end tag, a helper tag, and a ver-
ification tag. Each tag is a symbol in the field Fq; hence, the
total overhead is 3 |q| = 3 dlog2qe bits. Our communication
overhead is fixed, regardless of the network topology.
Unlike our scheme, the online overhead of the scheme
proposed by Li et al. [11] varies depending on the network
level. In particular, in [11], the authors define a level of a
node N as the length of the longest path from S to N . The
network level ` is defined as the maximum among the levels
of the nodes. In their scheme, each packet carries ` MAC tags
initially, then one or more tags are peeled off at every node
the packet goes through. The average overhead is therefore
approximately `2dlog2qe bits, which is linear in the network
level.
In [10], to achieve security 1
qd
and c-collusion resistance,
i.e., secure against any c colluding attackers, each packet
carries |X| MAC tags and each node verifies |B| tags, where
(X,B) is a (c, d)-cover free family. For instance, to provide
security 1q and 2-collusion resistance, each packet needs to
carry 49 tags and each node verifies 7 out of these 49 tags
[10]. The over head is 49dlog2qe in this case, or |B|dlog2qe
in general.
Compared to these two schemes, our detection scheme is
able to provide in-network detection with significantly less
communication overhead because of two main reasons: (i) we
exploit local subspace property (Lemma 1) and (ii) we delegate
the handling of colluding attackers to our locating scheme.
Table II summarizes the overhead of our detection scheme in
comparison to the other two schemes along with the supported
features.
Locating scheme. The communication overhead of our
locating scheme includes the λ tags carried by each packet,
the reporting vectors sent by the nodes, and the announcement
(containing the identified adversaries) sent by the controller.
The online overhead, which depends on the number of packets
sent in the network is the first one; the latter two overhead
exist only when there is a pollution attack detected, thus
are asymptotically negligible in the number of packets. The
overhead per packet is λ dlog2qe bits. Table III shows that with
an overhead of about 20 bytes per packet, the probability that
a malicious parent succeeds in preventing its child to report,
Pr[P ], and the probability that a malicious child succeeds in
disparaging its parent, Pr[N ], are both very small.
Compared to the scheme by Wang et al. [20], we have the
same amount of online overhead per packet (λ tags). However,
in [20], when a pollution attack is detected, the controller has
to compute multiple checksums for the polluted generation
and send these checksums to all the nodes. Each checksum
includes m symbols in Fq (recall that m is the number of
packets per generation). If µ checksums are computed (µ > 1
to improve the security guarantee), the overhead resulted in
sending the checksums to all nodes is |V|µm dlog2qe bits.
In contrast, our locating scheme does not need this checksum
dissemination.
Combined Scheme. The total online communication
overhead of our defense scheme is (3 + λ) dlog2qe bits. Note
that this overhead neither depends on the packet size nor the
generation size; hence, it becomes more inexpensive when the
packet size is large. For instance, for λ = 19, n = 1024,m =
32, q = 28, the per-packet communication overhead is only 2%
while the security of the detection is 2−8 and of the security
of the locating is 2−10. Most importantly, standing in stark
contrast to the other two schemes: [10] and [11], our overhead
is constant in terms of the network size and the number of
attackers.
C. Computation Overhead
The major computational overhead of both of our schemes
are from the algorithms Mac, Combine, and Verify performed
at each node for every packet. The computation cost for
the bootstrapping, reporting, and locating steps is a one-time
cost for a generation and thus is asymptotically negligible
in the number of packets. We subsequently focus on the
online computation cost incurred by the three algorithms of
SpaceMac.
Both the Mac and the Verify algorithms incur one PRG
call, m PRF calls, and (n + 2m) finite field multiplications.
Note that the results of both the PRG and PRF calls can be
cached and used for the whole generation. Thus, they can be
considered as a one-time cost as well. If we let w be the
average number of packets combined by each node, then the
Combine algorithm incurs w multiplications on average.
Detection Scheme. The operations performed by each
node in the detection scheme for each packet y include (i)
verifying the integrity of y using the Verify algorithm, (ii)
combining the received helper tags to generate a verification
tag for an outgoing packet z using the Combine algorithm,
(iii) computing a helper tag for z using the Mac algorithm.
If the node is the source, it needs to compute the end-to-end
tag using the Mac algorithm; however, in this case it does
not need to verify the integrity of packets. If it is a receiver,
it needs to verify the end-to-end tag by performing another
Verify algorithm. The worst case computational overhead, i.e.,
when the node is a receiver, in terms of the number of finite
field multiplications is 3 (n+ 2m) + w.
Locating Scheme. For each packet received, each node
verifies δ tags using the Verify algorithm. For each packet it
sends out, each node needs to compute λ tags using the Mac
algorithm. The total overhead is therefore (δ + λ) (n + 2m)
number of multiplications.
Combined Scheme. The overall computational overhead
per packet per node of our combined scheme is (3+δ+λ)(n+
2m) + w .
Comparison. The computational overhead per node per
packet of the scheme proposed by Li et al. [11] includes one
Combine and one Verify operation. Based on the closed-form
formulas provided in [11], this overhead is w ( `−12 ) + (n +
m+ `−12 ) number of multiplications. Finally, the computational
overhead per node per packet of the scheme proposed by
Agrawal and Boneh [10] includes one Combine and |B| Verify,
which is w |X|+ |B| (n+ 2m) number of multiplications.
For a concrete comparison, let q = 28, n = 1024,m =
32, w = 4, ` = 9 (for an average network of size 100, note
that log2100 ≈ 6). Table IV shows the set of appropriate
parameters and their corresponding computation overhead to
achieve the security 2−8 for all schemes. Following [10], we
implement multiplication in F28 by creating an offline multi-
plication table, storing all 216 products of pairs of elements in
this field. The table only occupies about 64 KB in C/C++ and
128 KB in Java (since there is no 8-bit primitive data type
in Java that has values from 0 to 28-1). This table enables
us to achieve fast multiplication, which is now just a table
lookup. Note that this approach is not possible (space-wise)
when working with large field, for instance, any scheme that
relies on public key cryptography, such as, [12]–[14], requires
a large field size, i.e., dlog2qe ≥ 128. The details about the
platforms we use are provided in Section IX-D. The numbers
reported in Table IV are averaged over 106 multiplications.
As shown in Table IV, the computational latency of our
detection scheme is in the same order of magnitude as the
other two detection schemes. Table IV also shows that the
latency of our combined detection-locating scheme is about
10 times higher than that of our detection scheme, or 30 times
higher than that of RIPPLE.
This is the trade-off when one wants to locate and eliminate
all attackers. If one chooses not to locate and eliminate the
attackers, they may keep flooding their child nodes with
corrupted packets along with their MAC tags. This not only
wastes the child nodes’ download bandwidth, but also exhausts
their computational resources since they need to constantly
run the verification algorithm on the corrupted packets. Fur-
thermore, the attackers may only send out corrupted packets
but not valid packets. This means that all packets they receive
# Tags Mac Combine Verify Security
C/C++ 1 28 0.02 28 2
−8
4 112 0.08 112 2−32
Java 1 61 0.09 61 2
−8
4 244 0.36 244 2−32
Android 1 2,273 0.66 2,273 2
−8
4 9,092 2.64 9,092 2−32
TABLE V
Computational time in µs of SpaceMac algorithms in F28
from their parent nodes are not used at all, which implies
that the upload bandwidth of the parent nodes is also wasted.
Apparently, the more parents and children the attackers have,
and/or the larger the number of attackers the network has, the
more resources are wasted due to the attack.
Nevertheless, we note that even though the combined
detection-locating scheme has one order of magnitude larger
computational delay than other stand-alone detection schemes,
its delay is still very small, in the order of sub-millisecond on
a PC or millisecond on a resource-constrained Android phone
(Samsung Captivate). Therefore, when operating on PCs or
smart phones, we strongly recommend using our full scheme.
In scenarios where the network cannot afford the computation
overhead of the locating scheme, each node may want to keep
a threshold (per parent) of how many corrupted packets it
detects from this parent so far, and refuse to receive packets
from the parent after the number of corrupted packets crosses
this threshold. This reduces the waste of the node’s download
bandwidth and CPU time.
D. Library
We implement all three algorithms of SpaceMac in both
C/C++ and Java and provide them as a library. As mentioned
before, we implement field multiplication using a look-up
table. We implement addition as a simple XOR operation.
Finally, we implement PRF and PRG using AES with CBC
mode of operation. The AES implementation is provided by
the standard crypto library [29] for Java implementation and
crypto++ open-source library [30] for C/C++ implementation.
We make our SpaceMac library available online along with the
source code [21].
This library is useful for those who want to adopt our
SpaceMac scheme into their system, or those who want to
deploy our proposed defense scheme. The C/C++ implemen-
tation is faster than the Java implementation; it is meant to
be used by low-level or embedded devices, such as, network
routers. The Java implementation, meanwhile, is useful for
high-level application-layer programs, such as, peer-to-peer
applications. Furthermore, the Java implementation is ready
to be run on the current Android OS (Android 2.2 Froyo).
This provides support for the rising implementation of network
coding on smart phones, such as, the work in [31], [32], and
[33].
Table V provides the benchmark of all three algorithms
of SpaceMac. For the benchmark, we set n = 1024,m =
32, w = 4. Except for the Android benchmark, both the C/C++
and Java implementations were run on a PC with a quad-core
2.8 Ghz processor and 32 GB of RAM. Our Android device,
RIPPLE [11] Broadcast MAC [10] Our Detection Our Full System
Features
In-network detection In-network detection In-network detection In-network detection
Arbitrary collusion res. c-collusion res. Arbitrary collusion res. Arbitrary collusion res.
Tag-pollution res. No tag pollution res. Tag pollution res. Tag pollution res.
No locating No locating No locating Exact locating
Network Params. q = 28, n = 1024,m = 32, w = 4, ` = 9
Scheme Params. |X| = 49, |B| = 7, c = 2 λ = 19, δ = 9, θ = 3
Security 2−8
# Multiplications 1,096 7,812 3,268 33,732
C/C++ (µs) 5.5 39.1 16.3 168.7
Java (µs) 6.6 46.9 19.6 202.4
Android (µs) 116.2 828.1 346.4 3,575.6
TABLE IV
Online computation overhead per packet per node in terms of the number of finite field multiplications, computing latency in C/C++, Java, and on an
Android platform (Samsung Captivate)
Number of attackers 4 8 12 16 20
Average # of generations 1.92 3.01 4.16 4.77 5.64
Average delay (ms) 412 647 896 1,031 1,217
TABLE VI
The average number of generations and delay required to detect all attackers
in a network with 50 intermediate nodes.
the Samsung Captivate, has a single 1 Ghz processor and 512
MB RAM. The reported values correspond to the averages
taken over 105 runs of each algorithm. The most expensive
operations of Mac and Verify algorithms are the PRF and PRG
calls; however, we stress that these calls can be done offline.
For completeness, the reported values include the cost of these
calls.
From Table V, we can see that in order to achieve high
security (2−32), the computational latency of our C/C++
implementation is only in the order of hundreds of microsec-
onds. Moreover, even on the Android resource-constrained
device, the computational latency of Mac and Verify are still
very small, only in the order of millisecond. Note that the
Combine operation is several orders of magnitude faster than
the Mac and Verify algorithms since it only involves finite field
multiplications, which are quick table lookups. These results
demonstrate that SpaceMac algorithms are fast and appropriate
for practical use.
E. Simulation
We implement a simulation in Python that simulates a
scenario where there are multiple colluding attackers in a
network. We generate between a pair of source and receiver
nodes a random directed acyclic graph network of 50 nodes
using the pygraph library [34]. The ratio of edges to nodes is
a random number in [1, 5]. All edges have a random end-to-
end delay between 10 and 100 ms. In a single generation, 32
packets in F105628 (q = 2
8, n = 1024,m = 32) are generated
and sent by the source node. The locating process is triggered
multiple times, each time by an alert by the receiver.
The attackers in the network are chosen randomly from
the population of 50 nodes in the network in a way that
each attacker can still pollute the network even when the
rest attackers are removed. The attackers pollute all of their
outgoing edges. When requested by the controller, most of
them honestly report their incoming subspaces; however, some
of them, who have malicious parents, lie about their received
subspaces from those parents. This emulates the case where
the attackers collude to manipulate the reports of their incom-
ing subspaces.
We evaluate the average number of generations to locate all
η attackers in the network, where η varies from 4 to 20. For
each η, we perform the simulation for 100 rounds (varying
the network topology, attacker location, and edge delays) to
get the average value. We also evaluate the average delay
it takes to identify all attackers, where the delay refers to
the time between when the source starts sending and when
all the attackers are located. The results shown in table VI
indicate that we succeed in locating all attackers very quickly
(about second for 20 attackers) and after much smaller than η
generations (5.5 generations for 20 attackers).
X. CONCLUSION
In this work, we introduce a novel homomorphic MAC
scheme for expanding space called SpaceMac. We propose
a cooperative defense system against pollution attacks built
on SpaceMac. To the best of our knowledge, our system
is the first that can provide both in-network detection and
exact locating of the attackers. In addition, our system is
collusion resistant and tag-pollution resistant. Our evaluation
results using real implementation in C/C++ and Java on
multiple devices demonstrate that our defense scheme incurs
both low communication and low computation overhead. We
implemented SpaceMac as a ready-to-use library and make it
available online.
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
Recall that the server checks λ−δ tags, and in order for the
server to accept a report, there must be at least θ valid tags.
The probability that the child successfully forges a SpaceMac
tag is 1q ; and so, the probability that the child fails to forge
such a tag is 1− 1q . Let i be the number of valid tags. The stated
probability is a direct result of enumerating the probability of
success of the child in all the cases.
PROOF OF LEMMA 6
Let yr denote the random packet of the parent’s space
that the child chooses to report to the controller: yr =∑
j∈D αj yj , where αj 6= 0 and D is a subset of indices of
the packets sent from the parent to the child.
Recall that the child is benign and always uses Combine
to generate tag for yr. Let x denote the number of correctly
computed tags of yr, i.e., the parent uses Mac to compute the
corresponding x tags for every yj for j ∈ D. The value of x
must be smaller than δ+θ otherwise the controller will accept
yr as there are at least θ valid tags. Let i out of these x tags
be the number of tags verifiable by the child, i ≤ min(δ, x).
Since yr has δ − i not correctly computed and verifiable by
the child, there are at least δ − i not correctly computed tags
which are verifiable by the child among the tags of yj’s. Thus,
the probability that the child accepts all yj’s is at most 1qδ−i .
The remaining x−i tags of yr are checked by the controller.
These tags of yr are valid tags; hence, x− i must be smaller
than θ otherwise the controller will accept the report. Thus,
x− i < θ; hence, i ≥ max(x− θ+ 1, 0). The probability that
the controller rejects yr equals to the probability that there
are less than θ valid tags. Since there are already x− i valid
tags, this probability equals
prej =
θ−(x−i)−1∑
j=0
(
θ − (x− i)− 1
j
)
1
qj
(1− 1
q
)λ−δ−(x−i)−j ,
where j denotes the number of valid tags out of the rest λ−
δ − (x− i) tags. Note that prej ≤ 1.
Putting the above values together, the probability that the
child accepts all yj’s which form yr and the server rejects yr
when there are x correctly computed tags is upper bounded
as follows:
p(x) ≤ 1(
λ
x
) · min(δ,x)∑
i=max(x−θ+1,0)
[(
δ
i
)(
λ− δ
x− i
)
· 1
qδ−i
· prej
]
≤ 1(
λ
x
) · min(δ,x)∑
i=max(x−θ+1,0)
[(
δ
i
)(
λ− δ
x− i
)
· 1
qδ−i
]
The best probability is the maximum of p(x)’s.
